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A number of the articles in the December 
2017 edition of SACQ, which focused on 
protest, made reference to the SJC10 case, 
for which judgment was pending at the 
time of publication. The case was important 
because it challenged the requirement – set 
out in the Regulation of Gatherings Act 1993 
(RGA) – that the convener of a gathering of 
more than 15 people must notify the relevant 
Judgment in the long-awaited SJC10 case was handed down on 24 January 2018. This case marks 
a victory for the collective bane on civil society – that of the criminalisation of a convener of a protest 
for the failure to provide notice. It goes a long way to opening the space for more serious 
engagement on the legitimacy of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 1993 and its possible 
reformulation to give effect to section 17 of the Constitution – the right to peaceful and unarmed 
assembly. This appeal to the high court was brought by the SJC on very limited grounds, focusing 
only on the requirement to provide notice – a strategy that has paid off, as the contested section of 
the Regulation of Gatherings Act was declared unconstitutional. This case note dissects some of the 
key arguments raised by the SJC and by the state, and analyses the court’s reasoning in reaching 
this finding. 
municipal authority in order to comply with the 
requirements for a lawful protest.1 A number 
of authors in the edition pointed to issues with 
the administrative requirements of the RGA, 
including the one that saw the SJC10 arrested 
and charged.2 Many in the public interest 
law space were watching the case carefully, 
because it tested the judiciary’s appetite for 
reforming the law that regulates protest in 
South Africa.
On 24 January 2018, a unanimous judgment 
was handed down by Ndita J and Magona 
AJ in the Western Cape High Court, which 
upheld the constitutional arguments made by 
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the SJC10 and declared section 12(1)(a) of the 
Act unconstitutional in so far as it criminalises a 
convener for failure to provide notice. This case 
note addresses the judgment and highlights 
its importance in terms of South Africa’s 
jurisprudence on protest.
The basics: understanding the case
The Social Justice Coalition (SJC) is a civil 
society organisation that advocates for better 
access to socio-economic rights, particularly 
for those living in informal settlements.3 On 
11 September 2013, members of the SJC 
participated in a gathering at the Civic Centre in 
the City of Cape Town. The SJC activists had 
not provided notice in terms of the RGA. During 
the trial, the SJC10 argued that the event was 
initially planned as a picket.4 In terms of the 
Act, there is no notice requirement for a picket, 
and so none was served. However, section 
3 of the Act requires notice for a gathering, 
which is defined as ‘an assembly, concourse 
or procession of more than 15 persons’ in a 
public space.5 A group of 15 members chained 
themselves to each other and to the railings 
at the entrance to the Civic Centre. There was 
some disagreement between the parties during 
trial about whether the entrance to the Civic 
Centre was blocked by the human chain. In 
the end, the trial court appeared to accept the 
version of the appellants that there was no 
blockage, relying on photographs handed in as 
evidence that members of the public had made 
use of another stairway to gain access to the 
Civic Centre.6
During the course of the picket, the people who 
were chained to the railings switched places 
and, as it happened, at various points the 
number of protesters grew to more than 15.7 
This increase in number beyond the threshold 
of 15 meant that the event changed in 
definition from a picket (which requires no 
notice) to a gathering, which requires notice 
under section 3. 
The police arrested 21 people on the scene. Ten 
SJC activists were charged in the magistrates’ 
court in Cape Town with contravening section 
12(1)(a) of the Act by unlawfully and intentionally 
convening a gathering without giving the 
required notice to the relevant municipal 
authority.8 In the alternative, they were charged 
with attending a gathering where no notice had 
been given.9 Although 21 activists were initially 
arrested, the court distinguished between 
members who had been part of organising the 
event, and those who had not. This is relevant 
because section 12(1)(a) is only applicable to 
conveners of a gathering. A convener is 
defined as:
(a)  any person who, of his own accord, 
convenes a gathering; and
(b)  in relation to any organization or branch of 
any organization, any person appointed 
by such organization or branch in terms of 
section 2(1).10
The SJC10, who had been identified as 
conveners of the event and charged with 
contravention of the RGA, pleaded not guilty. 
At trial they were convicted on the main charge 
– unlawfully and intentionally convening a 
gathering without giving the required notice to 
the relevant municipal authority. The sentence 
handed down was a caution, which meant 
that no period of imprisonment or a fine 
was ordered.11 
The trial court (and later the appeal court) was 
not immune to the context surrounding the 
SJC protest. The appeal court factored in the 
significant role of SJC in Khayelitsha and its 
ongoing and lengthy engagement with the 
City of Cape Town. In this sense, there is 
recognition by the court that protests occur 
when other mechanisms or avenues of 
engagement have failed.12
The SJC10 were awarded leave to appeal 
by the trial court against their conviction for 
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contravention of section 12(1)(a). The appeal 
is based on arguments that section 12(1)(a) is 
unconstitutional and therefore invalid. While this 
challenge was a narrow one, targeting only the 
criminalisation of the failure to provide notice, 
the case provided an opportunity to test the 
judiciary’s appetite for bringing the Act in line 
with the constitutional right to protest. 
This is a landmark case because it is the first 
direct challenge to the RGA. The judgment 
is welcomed for upholding the constitutional 
challenge to the Act. This represents the 
judiciary’s willingness to develop a statute 
enacted pre-Constitution, and further 
advances the right to protest. The case must 
be understood in light of the social and legal 
context for protest, and I turn to that issue 
next. The note will begin by contextualising the 
Act in terms of South Africa’s social, political 
and legal history. The arguments made before 
the court and the reasoning of the court will 
be discussed, with a view to analysing the 
significance of this case for the right to protest.
The Act’s legal and social context
Part of the importance of challenging the 
Act stems from its legal and social context, 
and questions raised around the RGA’s 
appropriateness in South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy. The Act was enacted in 1993, 
during the last days of apartheid.13 Although 
negotiations for a democratic South Africa were 
already underway,14 it could be argued that the 
Act is tainted by its moment in time. This was 
a time when dissent was criminalised.15 The 
intention of the legislature in 1993 may have 
been to restrict the right to protest.16 However, 
the Act must now be interpreted through 
the prism of the Constitution. Any piece of 
legislation must be in line with the ‘spirit, purport 
and objects’ of the Constitution.17 
Notwithstanding its contentious start, the 
Act is the leading piece of legislation giving 
effect to section 17 of the Constitution, which 
provides the right to assemble peacefully.18 
Legislation that gives effect to a provision of 
the Constitution becomes the direct means 
of regulation of conduct, and cannot be 
circumvented by recourse to the Constitution 
as a first resort.19 What this means is that 
conduct related to protest is bound to comply 
with the Act (unless the Act conflicts with the 
Constitution). This first direct challenge by the 
SJC against the Act is therefore a step in the 
direction of reimagining legislation to give effect 
to section 17.
The fact that protest is protected in both 
our interim and final Constitution reflects the 
importance of protest in our society. The 
preamble to the Act also recognises this, 
stating that:
[E]very person has the right to assemble 
with other persons and to express his 
views on any matter freely in public and 
to enjoy the protection of the State while 
doing so; and the exercise of such right 
shall take place peacefully and with due 
regard to the rights of others.20
This means that not only is the right to protest 
available to everyone in South Africa, but that 
persons who protest can expect protection 
from state bodies such as the police.21 
However, various accounts, from civil society 
organisations in particular, have argued that the 
Act fails to give effect to the right in section 17,22 
giving rise to the impetus to challenge the Act.
Principal arguments made 
to the court
There are many potential grounds of challenge 
to the Act.23 The challenges raised by the 
SJC10 in this case relate to the constitutionality 
of the criminalisation for failure to provide 
notice as provided for in section 12(1)(a) of the 
Act. This issue was the most well-publicised 
controversy related to the Act because of 
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the criminal consequences attached to the 
administrative requirement to provide notice, 
and the publicity around this case. 
The fact that the SJC case raised only a limited 
challenge is in some ways a pity as it does 
not challenge the legitimacy of the Act in and 
of itself. On the other hand, this does create 
the scope for challenging the Act as a long-
term project and leaves open the opportunity 
for further cases to be brought in the future. 
Judges can only decide the specific dispute 
before them. The SJC10 narrowed their 
complaint to the criminalisation for failing to 
provide notice (and not the notice requirement 
itself). It was strategic to challenge low-hanging 
fruit; that is, the aspect of the Act that was 
clearly ripe for criticism.24
The constitutional challenge raised by the 
SJC10 is that criminalising the act of convening 
a gathering without notice effectively makes it 
a crime to hold a peaceful gathering (if notice is 
not given).25 This goes further than the internal 
limitations in section 17 of the Constitution, 
which only specifies that a protest should 
be peaceful and those participating must 
be unarmed.26 The SJC therefore argued, in 
essence, that the consequence of this provision 
of the RGA is that ordinary people will be 
deterred from exercising their constitutionally-
protected right to protest,27 or may risk 
criminalisation for doing so if they are not 
aware of the administrative requirements under 
the Act. 
There are a number of arguments made by 
the second respondent, the Minister of Police, 
who opposed the application for appeal 
(hereafter, referred to as ‘the Minister’). The 
first respondent, the state, did not oppose 
the application for appeal, choosing to abide 
by any decision by the court. The Minister’s 
arguments were largely two-fold: firstly, that the 
purpose of the notice requirement is to allow for 
proper police planning, including the distribution 
of police resources, and secondly that the 
criminalisation of the failure to provide notice 
deterred those intending to protest from doing 
so without giving notice. The Minister’s heads of 
argument for the appeal contended that:
The reason as to why convening a 
gathering in respect of which no notice 
has been given is an offence in terms of 
section 12(1)(a) is the deterrent effect that 
the criminalisation of such conduct has. 
Simply put, in the absence of a criminal 
sanction, persons would be able to 
convene gatherings in respect of which no 
notice has been given without any adverse 
consequence at all. The criminalisation of 
such conduct undoubtedly has a serious 
deterrent effect.28
The overarching argument by the Minister is that 
the rights of protesters cannot take precedence 
over other competing rights,29 for example, the 
right to safety and security of other persons. 
Analysis of the court’s reasoning
Amid much celebration from the gallery in the 
room, the court upheld the appeal against the 
conviction of the 10 appellants and declared 
section 12(1)(a) unconstitutional in so far as 
it criminalises convening a gathering where 
no notice was provided. This was a decided 
victory for the SJC and for many social 
organisations that have been engaged in 
battle with municipalities over the notorious 
notice requirement in section 3 because it is 
onerous and overly administrative.30 It is also a 
marked move towards the possibility of further 
successful challenge to the Act because it 
shows that courts may be willing to develop the 
Act in line with the constitutional right to protest. 
In assessing the arguments made by both 
the SJC10 and the Minister, the court had to 
balance the protection of the right to protest 
(essentially arguments raised by the SJC10) 
with the importance of the purpose of the 
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criminalisation for failure to provide notice, 
such purpose argued by the Minister to be 
to deter protests without notice. The right to 
protest in section 17 of the Constitution is a 
broadly-drafted provision that does not contain 
requirements to provide notice for logistical 
planning, nor the consequences for failing to 
give notice. The Act, by requiring notice for this 
purpose, serves to limit the right to protest. A 
court faced with such a constitutional challenge 
has to determine if the right to protest is 
unreasonably narrowed by the criminalisation for 
failing to give notice. 
The court considered the two-part test to 
determine if the right is unjustifiably infringed: 
firstly, whether the right is limited, and secondly, 
whether such limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in a democratic society.31 A limitation 
of a constitutional right occurs where a law 
or the implementation of a law restricts the 
enjoyment of that right. In relation to part one, 
the court found that the facts of this case, 
where all the conveners were arrested and 
convicted of failing to provide notice, reflect a 
clear limitation of the right to protest.32 The court 
noted here that the ‘effect of section 12(1)(a) 
appears to be quite chilling’. This kind of strong 
language reflects the court’s concern with the 
criminalisation of protest.
The second part of the test is the more 
important and complex one, because not every 
limitation of a right in the Bill of Rights will be 
deemed unconstitutional.33 If the reason for the 
limitation is acceptable, the infringement may 
not be unconstitutional.34 For example, the 
police are granted powers to search and seize 
for the purposes of a criminal investigation.35 
This is considered a reasonable restriction on 
the right to privacy.36 
Section 36 of the Constitution requires that a 
court use five factors to determine whether a 
limitation is justified or not. These factors are 
the nature of the right,37 the importance of 
the purpose of the limitation,38 the nature and 
extent of the limitation,39 the relation between 
the limitation and its purpose,40 and whether 
there are less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose.41 The court in this matter did conduct 
this five-pronged inquiry – although this note 
only highlights a few of the most salient points. 
The court references the Constitutional Court 
case in SATAWU v Garvas, leaving no doubt of 
its understanding of the importance of the right 
to protest:
The right to freedom of assembly is 
central to our constitutional democracy. 
It exists primarily to give a voice to 
the powerless. This includes groups 
that do not have political or economic 
power, and other vulnerable persons. It 
provides an outlet for their frustrations. 
This right will, in many cases, be the only 
mechanism available to them to express 
their legitimate concerns. Indeed, it is one 
of the principal means by which ordinary 
people can meaningfully contribute to 
the constitutional objective of advancing 
human rights and freedoms. This is only 
too evident from the brutal denial of this 
right and all the consequences following 
therefrom under apartheid. In assessing 
the nature and importance of the right, we 
cannot therefore ignore its foundational 
relevance to the exercise and achievement 
of all other rights.42
The court, in referencing SATAWU v Garvas, 
highlights the importance of the right and 
sustains the need to protect the right to protest. 
The next point of inquiry is whether the reason 
for the limitation is compelling, and not just 
generally useful.43 The Minister’s primary 
arguments were that the notice requirement was 
included to ensure that the police could plan the 
allocation of resources effectively. The Minister 
argued that the criminalisation of the failure to 
provide the notice acts as a deterrent.44 The 
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Act, however, goes further than regulating 
the logistical details of a protest. Section 9, 
which details the powers of the police during 
a gathering, is especially problematic. While 
the police would ordinarily have jurisdiction to 
monitor an event that involves a large group of 
people in a public space, section 9 gives explicit 
and specific authority to the police to intervene 
in various stages of the protest.45
The court reiterates that section 9 
demonstratively gives the police powers to 
manage a gathering reasonably.46 This would 
seem superfluous in light of the police’s general 
duties and powers in the Constitution.47 The 
need for specific police powers in the Act is 
perhaps a relic of its time and context, where 
the role of the police in protest was at the 
forefront of the minds of the legislative drafters 
and Parliament. Thus, the limitation is not 
necessary for the police role that is highlighted 
by the Minister. A more important critique is 
that the court accepted the Minister’s assertion 
that the notice requirement assists the police 
with proper planning, seemingly without really 
interrogating the plausibility of this claim. The 
SJC10 did not dispute that providing notice 
was important. In fact, they agreed that giving 
notice was useful to provide the opportunity 
to engage the municipal authority on issues 
related to logistics, including traffic and safety.48 
The emphasis on proper planning is therefore 
misplaced as a reason to explain the importance 
of the limitation and misplaced as a reason 
accepted by the court.
The Minister’s contention in respect of the 
deterrent effect of criminalising conveners 
warrants attention. As described earlier, 
the Minister argued that without a serious 
consequence, the convening of protests without 
notice will not be deterred.49 
The issue of deterrence in the criminal justice 
system is an ongoing one. The court in S v J 
said,’[I]t is deterrence (including prevention) 
which has been described as the “essential”, 
“all important”, “paramount” and “universally 
admitted” object of punishment.’50 In 
contrast, post-Constitution the court in S v 
Makwanyane,51 while interpreting the right to life 
in relation to the death penalty, weighed up the 
need for deterrence with the availability of other 
alternatives. Mahomed J specifically clarified 
that ‘[c]rime is a multi-faceted phenomenon. It 
has to be assaulted on a multi-dimensional level 
to facilitate effective deterrence.’52 
There must be a strong likelihood that the 
limitation will achieve its intended purpose, 
and that there are no means of achieving 
the purpose with less restriction on the 
right.53 The Minister conflated the purpose 
of the notice requirement (which was not a 
point of contention) with the purpose of the 
criminalisation for failure to give notice. The 
court, by accepting the deterrence argument 
and finding that there is a legitimate purpose 
served by the limitation,54 fell into this trap 
as well. 
The court, in my view, did not take an holistic 
approach to the section 36 factors. The court 
could have gone further in considering the 
deterrence argument in light of the other 
factors and weighing up whether criminalisation 
does serve a legitimate purpose in this 
context.55 The court should have balanced its 
recognition of the importance of protest against 
the need to deter the convening of gatherings 
without notice. 
The court itself admits that deterrence should 
not be the primary factor when weighing up the 
importance of the limitation:
The effect of the limitation therefore is 
not only to punish the convenors for 
failing to serve a notice, it is also to 
deter people from exercising their right 
to free assembly. That much is clear 
from the fact that deterrence is one of 
the purposes of criminal punishment. 
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It is well established that deterrence is 
the use of punishment to prevent the 
offender from repeating his offence and to 
demonstrate to other potential offenders 
what will happen to them if they follow the 
wrongdoer’s example.56 
Following this reasoning, the court ultimately 
found that section 12(1)(a) was unjustifiable, 
but its acceptance of the deterrent effect of 
criminalisation placed too much emphasis on 
the importance of deterrence, negating some of 
its earlier discussion on the context of protest in 
South Africa. 
The court makes no distinction between a crime 
that harms (whether it be a person, property or 
society), and the regulatory crime that is created 
by section 12(1)(a), aimed at facilitating the 
exercise of a constitutionally protected right.57 
Thus while the court reached a sound final 
conclusion, the reasoning skips some steps of 
logic in so far as it deals with deterrence as a 
stand-alone factor.
The appellants argued that section 12(1)(a) is 
arbitrary in that it treats all types of gatherings 
equally in terms of whether notice is required or 
not. Specifically, they argued that this is a false 
equivalence in that some gatherings require 
police resources, while others do not.58 The 
appellants did not raise an issue in relation to 
the definition, which means that – because 
the judgment does not distinguish different 
types of gatherings – the Act in effect remains 
over-broad in criminalising all gatherings.59 The 
court commendably deals with this issue by 
its own hand, suggesting that an alternative to 
criminalisation could look to defining what a 
‘gathering’ is.60 The court cautions that this will 
not solve all issues related to section 12(1)(a). 
This is something that should be done in any 
event, even if it is to clarify the confusion 
created by the differing language in section 17 
and the Act.
There are a number of extremely laudable 
aspects to this judgment. Firstly, the judgment 
contains a clear recognition of and respect 
for the importance of protest in South Africa’s 
history. Secondly, it shows a concerted effort 
to balance the often competing interests of 
protesters and the state. Thirdly, the judgment 
articulates the possible alternative consequences 
to criminalisation for failing to provide notice, 
which is beyond the scope of the court.61 Finally, 
the judgment refers extensively to international 
law in so far as it relates to the arguments made 
in support of the appellants by the amici curiae.62
The court’s section 36 analysis achieves what 
is intended by the limitations clause: a balance 
between competing rights.63 In this case, it is 
the rights of those who protest and the state, 
particularly the police, in maintaining order. By 
maintaining the importance of the notice period 
for planning (although this was not disputed by 
the appellants) and simultaneously recognising 
the chilling effect that criminal sanctions have 
on those wanting to protest, the court strikes a 
healthier equilibrium in the Act. 
Conclusion
This judgment is a big step in the legal arena 
to challenge the most directly controversial 
aspect of the RGA, that of the criminalisation 
that attaches to a convener for failure to provide 
notice. The judgment tries to find a balance 
between the various competing interests, 
particularly the right of ordinary members of the 
public to protest, and the interests of the police 
to fulfil their constitutional mandate to maintain 
order and safety. 
The judgment ends by quoting the phrase 
used in SATAWU v Garvas of a ‘“never again” 
Constitution’.64 This strong statement suggests 
that the court was not shying away from its duty 
to interpret legislation in light of the Constitution. 
Although this note argues that the court could 
have gone further in grappling with the section 
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36 factors, the court did what it was asked: to 
consider whether section 12(1)(a) goes too far in 
regulating protest. 
This was the first court challenge to the Act. 
It opens the door to further strategic litigation, 
perhaps leading up to challenging the Act’s 
constitutionality as a whole. The right to protest 
and the Act are likely to remain an interesting 
and evolving area of the law in the near future.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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